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Abstract  
Several policies or interventions have been implemented in developing countries with the 
ultimate goal of improving educational outcomes and human capital. While lots of empirical 
studies  have pointed  to mixed  results  of these  interventions, the role of uncertainty arising 
from the state of the nature about educational environment, household characteristics,  
along- side the eﬃciency  of these interventions still lack economic mechanism.  This paper 
aims at developing a theoretical framework that links policy interventions to educational 
outcomes. We characterize optimal policies and determine the conditions for enhancing 
social welfare. We also study  the optimal  growth of the economy under uncertainty and 
population  heterogeneity  when human  capital  is produced  and  used  in the education  
sector.   We show that the growth rate of the unskilled population has a direct impact on the 
growth of human and physical capitals. 
Key words: Educational outcome, policy interventions, social welfare, skilled and unskilled 
labor, endogenous growth  
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1 Introduction
In many developing countries, the education sector has experienced several policy interventions,
that is to say, the application of new resources or approaches that change practices to improve
the accumulation of human capital and well-being, especially that of pupils. These interventions
result in better achievements or performance of pupils at school, viz, improvement of academic
outcomes, increased enrollment and attendance rates, and reduced drop-out and repetition rates.
Hargreaves (2003) states that `the opportunity to engage actively in innovations (or interven-
tions) and the means of transferring successful interventions in some schools to other schools, are
conditions that can support innovations in education'.1 As outlined by Frank et al. (2004) and
Gro and Mouza (2008), the success of these policies depends on the capacity and disposition
of policy makers. The relationship between these two factors can be analyzed using two models:
i) the `distance and dependence model' that makes explicit how the specic context can aect
a policy and help identifying its success by showing its dierence from existing practice and
resources, and ii) `the layers of inuence model' that distinguishes the inuences that aect the
conditions of a policy and the policy maker.
The rst model sheds new light on the debate `pedagogy before practice' by suggesting that
the implementation of an intervention depends on close connection of practice and technolog-
ical issues. The model was initially drawn from a study on technology-based innovation, but
it can also be used for non-technology-based approaches in education. The model enables us
to depict how an intervention can be assessed through its distance from current practice and
its dependence on available resources. This model predicts that a policy has better chances
of being accepted if it is close to existing practices. These practices can be related to educa-
tional environment. An intervention in education also needs resources that dier from existing
ones.2 For example, if an intervention requires a great change in home inputs practice and more
nancial resources, then it needs more support to succeed than an intervention that requires
fewer resources or one that demands little change from the home's existing practice. As such,
implementing a policy in educational environment can imply that one forgoes other policies so
as to respond to resource need of implied by some initial intervention. The complexity of edu-
cational policies can follow from the level or mode of interventions: national, community based,
school or individual levels. As a result, the success depends on the extent to which the change is
understood and recharged. Hence, fostering educational policy requires an analysis of barriers
and resistances to changes.
The second framework { model of layers of inuence { analyzes the factors that aect policy
makers ability to implement an intervention. It conceptualizes the layers of inuence that aect
both the intervention and the policy maker.3 This model highlights the way layers interact
and the role of environmental conditions surrounding the interventions. The environmental
conditions that determine the failure or success of policies can be gathered into four categories:
Supportive informal social environment : This refers to the atmosphere and perception of
agents that may help adopting new practices.4
Formal environment : This constitutes the organizational infrastructure of an educational
system together with its formal policies and structures. This environment is crucial in providing
resources for interventions, and allowing interventions to become accessible through technical
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support policies.5
Risk aversion: Risk aversion is an important factor that inhibits the ability to innovate
and it has implications on the extent to which any educational policy targets the appropriate
conditions for interventions.
Shared visions: Refer to common perceptions of goals and requirements.6
Regardless of the approach adopted, the issue raised by policy interventions in education
can be stated as follows: How does uncertainty aect the impact of policy interventions in the
developing world? Indeed, in these countries, education is increasingly a crucial ingredient for
development programmes. The role of uncertainty may come through dierent facets. In general,
it is related to the state of nature, meaning exogenous factors unrelated to the policy that may
aect the policy implemented. In developing countries, uncertainty is much more pronounced
due in particular to the lack of resources and the level of development that ultimately can impact
on the success of interventions. For example, it is common to observe that after the starting of
implementation of an intervention at a given date, resource constraints are changing the object
of the intervention, reduce its ambition, or sometimes even stop it.
This paper aims to develop theoretical frameworks to link every specic type of new inter-
vention for each stakeholder to the global performance of education, taking into account the
social welfare maximization problem. We consider the production function of the school as a
black box where several factors combine (good school management, quality of school services
and access to education) and whose outcome is the nal performance of students. Our goal is
to evaluate the evolution of this performance over time, when policy makers rely on the quality
of the school production, e.g. educational outcome. Their interventions consist of changing the
performance from an initial period to a nal period, taking into account the constraints that may
arise. To do this, we rst link the vector of performance to the vector of constraints, assuming
dierent types of relationships between these vectors.
In a rst specication, we consider linear and nonlinear deterministic relationships and char-
acterize the optimal interventions which give the best performance given the constraints and
initial conditions. Then, recognizing that the lack of information on the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of students and the educational environment in which interventions are implemented,
among others, are uncertainty factors that may impede the achievement of performance objec-
tives, we introduce uncertainty in the framework. Here again, we consider linear and nonlinear
approaches. We nd out the optimal conditions under which actions can be taken. Furthermore,
we enlarge the analysis to the question of how the performance of the educational system can
be integrated into a macroeconomic performance (in terms of well-being and economic growth).
Several results emerge from this study. Firstly, we consider the benchmark framework with-
out uncertainty. In this set up, we consider both the linear and the nonlinear cases. For the
linear model, we assume that the relationship between changes in performance and successive
interventions are additive and separable. We study the growth rate of educational performance,
their trend and the average change in performance due to a specic intervention. The main re-
sult is that interventions that allow to move from one level of initial performance to a nal level
are also additive and linear, and ultimately they may be constant in a regular time intervals.
They also depend on the temporal growth rate of performances, that would have prevailed if
there was no response. For the nonlinear model, we have shown that interventions are possible,
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even in the case of resistance, meaning factors that preclude performances. These interventions
can be coordinated, so common to all stakeholders.
Further, we illustrate these ndings with some examples. In the rst, interventions can fade
over time, which means that students at a given date can be left at their free course, when they
reached a sucient level of performance which is high enough to be irreversible. In the second
example, the intervention depends linearly on initial conditions in regular time intervals. This
means that interventions are implemented gradually, until the desired level of performance is
reached. In the last example, only one type of intervention is made to achieve the desired the
performance, regardless of which decision maker applies it.
Secondly, the framework with uncertainty also considers linear and nonlinear probabilistic
models. The occurrence of random events is integrated. Relying on normal distribution of ran-
dom events, we express the optimality conditions of interventions, based on average probabilities.
We propose a methodology to solve these conditions. The optimality is based on maximizing
the probability of achieving the target performance from an initial period to the nal period.
We illustrate in an example how the construction of solutions relies on the correlation function
of the random process and the initial conditions.
Thirdly, we link the performance levels to social welfare, on the assumption that the ultimate
goal of policy makers is improving the well-being of all individuals. This can go by investing in
education of students. As in the previous case, we use deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
Taking the expected utility of consumption and investment in quality and access to education,
we show analytically the optimality conditions of these variables.
Lastly, we deal with economic growth with heterogenous population. Skilled and unskilled
groups have dierent demographic dynamics. The economy has two sectors: education and
production of goods and services. We show that the demographic growth rates of the two
populations have dierentiated impacts on economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a brief review
of the educational production performance. Section 3 develops frameworks of interventions in
education. Section 4 studies the optimality of interventions in terms of social welfare. Section 5
addresses the issue of global approach of interventions with heterogeneous populations and their
dynamics on economic growth under uncertainty. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Education performance: A brief review and empirical facts
The goal of achieving universal education in developing countries involves looking for ways
to produce eective and ecient schools. Eective teaching methods, based on survey data
acquired from schools, have shown their worth for almost fteen years. In order to identify
forms of eective schools, tools were developed primarily to measure whether countries can
achieve the goal of enroling all the children of school age, and then to evaluate the eectiveness
and quality of learning provided in schools.
Since the 1990s, PASEC has implemented in Francophone Africa, surveys to assess child
learning, collecting information on their characteristics: origin of children, their living con-
ditions (situation at home, medical, diet, economic well being of household, housing quality,
parental care etc), characteristics of teachers and schools, etc. These elements are often used
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as components of a production function of school (Bourdon, 2005). The problem is whether
there is a form of this function that is appropriate to describe the eective provision of universal
education and the performance of interventions in the education sector. A key challenge remains
in describing the cost of education.
2.1 The production function of school
The identication of the determinants of quality educational service is not trivial. Hanushek
(1986) shows that there is a bewildering range of issues including technical and esoteric conict-
ing results on the production process of the schools. He argues that there is still no clear answer
as to what are the factors that inuence pupils' performance. In this context, Pritchett (2001)
nds that the choices that guide an educational allowance are not often based on academic
performance.
Empirical facts contradict the hypothesis of an ecient allocation of resources that seeks to
maximize the school performance. This contradiction is attributed to four reasons. First, the
school is not a black box within which production technology follows market rules. Secondly,
the impact of schooling on the attainment may be small compared to the role and importance
of innate abilities of learners. Third, the demand for education is not facing a market, and the
production function cannot be observed eectively from an economic standpoint. Finally, the
education production function, if it is tested econometrically, cannot be generalized as already
shown by Hanushek (1986).
2.2 Measurement of education eectiveness
The optimal timing of school programs has been studied by Farrell (1957) and Charnes et al.
(1981). However, the diculty lies in identifying stable parameters of the production function,
most importantly those driven by the environment of school as well as households' characteristics.
The school production is represented by the results of pupil assessment in language, calculation,
the value of self-esteem reported by the pupils and also some more aggregate measures like
enrollment, promotion, dropout, etc. For instance, Battese and Coelli (1995) show that the
environmental variables can explain the remoteness of the border. Empirical studies are also
interested in identifying the best performing schools. Relying on parametric and nonparametric
approaches for envelope method, Cooper and Cohn (1997) have identied schools that are close
to the eciency frontier. The impact of intervention on the eectiveness of school have been
examined as well by Stiefel et al. (1999) using randomized control trials. The authors show
that there is a strong inertia between interventions and their eects on academic performance.
Klein (2007) used a Becker-Stigler-Peltzman like model to determine the socially optimal level
of intervention in education.
Other studies have tried to link school performance to the time of enrollment. For higher
education, Dolton et al. (2003) described a production function where academic success, given
by individual performance on the nal exam, depends on the time spent at school. They show
that the schooling time is four times less protable than teaching in a working group. As a
general form of intervention, they used public expenditure in education. Gupta and Verhoeven
(2001) evaluated the eectiveness of public expenditures in 37 African countries over the period
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1984-1995 and compared them with Asian and Western countries. They showed that on average,
African countries are less ecient than Asian countries and countries in the Western hemisphere.
Afonso et al. (2006) showed a clear distinction between countries according to indicators of
absolute performance and cost eective type indicators. National structures for utility costs can
play a crucial role and lead to situations where some systems oer public service and others
do not. This may be due to allocation rules and routine border performance allowed by the
technical frontier.
Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) used a Tobit model powered by the levels of eciency
from Data Envelopment Analysis (hereafter DEA), to explain the determinants of eciency of
secondary schools in Finland. In their approach, the education of parents is a driving factor
that determines the dierences in school performance. Bradley et al. (2001) also used the DEA
and Tobit model to evaluate the technical eciency of English secondary schools. The average
eciency rate obtained were between 83% and 75%. The authors also found that competition
between schools improves the eciency level of schools. This nding is consistent the results of
Waldo (2007) who studied the performance of Swedish secondary schools using DEA. In the case
of Portugal, Oliveira and Santos (2005) examined institutional indicators. They were particularly
interested in relaxing the convexity constraint. Simar (2003) found that the unemployment
rate, access to health services, adult education and infrastructure endowments are determinants
of academic performance. Rubenstein et al. (2007) used a sample of schools in the north-
eastern USA and found that the eectiveness of policies is conditioned by structural elements
including vocational training. This brief literature review outlines the ambiguity and diculty
of measuring the eciency and performance of school. The school with superior performance
can be the one that has better policy, but it can also be the one which is in a very favorable
environment.
3 A Theory of interventions in education
In most countries, education is largely a national public service, whose organization and oper-
ation are provided by the government.7 However, local administration can also be involved in
the development of this public service. There are several stakeholders in the education sector,
each with specic and complementary roles. At the national level, the government is competent
in all aspects of pedagogy, curricula, national qualications and management of teaching sta,
etc. At the regional level, local administrations (counties, districts, municipalities, etc.) are in
charge of the decentralized services of the ministry of education. The role of communities (e.g.
association of parents) is also important. Indeed, parents are full members of the educational
community. Through their representatives, they participate in school councils, class, and ad-
ministration of the institutions which indirectly implies the application of education policy. It
is worth to note that there often exist structures of consultation (which enable their opinion to
guide decision-making or allow actors and partners of education to meet and take decisions) and
sometimes technical committees dealing with issues of collective interest. Interventions by all
these stakeholders in education have direct and indirect impact on pupils' performance.
However, these interventions are implemented in an environment with uncertainty which is
related to the state of nature.8 This environment may be favorable or unfavorable to the expected
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result of the intervention. For example, unforeseen constraints (e.g. stochastic shocks) on
resource availability can lead policy makers to modify or discontinue the intervention. Similarly,
unobservable individual factors related to the environment can make the same intervention
more ecient for some individuals and less for some others. Sometimes, the results can go
in the opposite direction due to interaction with other factors. This raises the question as to
how uncertainty aects the impact of interventions in education. In what follows, we develop
simple models that account for these situations and help us to better understand the economic
mechanisms through which these interventions operate as well as their eects on well-being.
3.1 The benchmark model without uncertainty
Let Xt denote a vector whose n components are the criteria measuring agents' (pupils') per-
formance (e.g., achievements like score, repetition rate, etc). All interventions are captured by
the vector Ut with r components. The aim is to start with an initial state X0 and reach an
optimal state XT , where pupils' performance is better, T being the nal time for the eects of
interventions. The equation of variation of pupils' performance ia:
_Xt = F (t;Xt; Ut): (1)
The optimality means that in the nal state, the interventions lead to a state close to their
objectives. At the level of an agent, it does not mean that all performance indicators' at period
T are higher than those in the initial period. But the average level achieved with XT is expected
to be higher than the one with X0. We will consider two cases for Equation (1): the linear and
the nonlinear.
3.1.a The linear case
We assume that F can be written in the form
_Xt = P (t)Xt +Q(t)Ut +Rt (2)
where P (t) and Q(t) are matrices of respective order n  r and n  n. Equation 2 shows that
variations in performance are additive with respect to successive separable interventions. All
things being equal, P (t) represents the rate of growth performance in the absence of policy inter-
ventions with trend R(t). Similarly, Q(t) denotes the average change in performance following
an intervention. We can assume dierent frameworks: i) independence of interventions and ii)
existence of a centralized public target (as a global education policy overseen by the government,
in the form of recommendations to stakeholders) that guides the interventions. Let us consider
each of these frameworks in turn.
Proposition 1 The interventions leading X0 to XT can be written as:
Ut = B(t)c+ v(t) (3)
where c = A(T )[Y  1(T )XT  
R T
0 Y
 1()R() d] is a vector of constants, v is a function of time,
B(T ) = Y tQ(t) and Y (t) denotes the fundamental matrix of the system _Xt = P (t)Xt.
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the interventions are additive and linear and that
they apply consistently in regular intervals of time. That is, these interventions are not highly
variable and may be in the form of, for example, step functions so that each time a policy is
taken, it is maintained for a while, before another intervention is undertaken. This opens the
opportunity to regularly assess the eects of interventions and to modify them each time a new
performance target is set. Indeed, if the interventions are continuous and regular, without the
possibility of change, the costs could be unbearable and would lead to losses.
Proof. Given the fundamental matrix Y (t), let us assume that the initial condition has the form
Y (0) = E, with E being the unitary vector. Let us rewrite Xt = Y (t)Zt such that
_Zt = B(t)Ut +G(t) (4)
where B(t) = Y  1Q(t) and G(t) = Y  1R(t). By making the following transformation:
Zt = t +
Z t
0
G() d (5)
where t is a vectorial function that veries the equation:
_t = B(t)Ut (6)
It follows that8<:(0) = 0 = X0T = T = Y  1(T )XT   R T0 Y  1()R() d (7)
For sake of simplicity, let us suppose that r = 1, meaning that we only have one intervention.
The integration of Equation (6) gives the following system of integral equations:
T   0 =
Z T
0
B()U() d (8)
the solution of which takes the form Ut = B(t)c+ v(t) with c being a constant vector and v(t)
is a function such thatZ T
0
bs()v() d = 0 s = 1; 2;    ; n (9)
where the b's are the components of B. 
Proposition 1 also states that at any point of time there exist actions guiding agents' perfor-
mance. It can also be used when there are limit conditions. Indeed, if we state them as
SX
j=0
GjX(tj) := H (10)
where H is a vector with m components and tj are such that 0  t0 < t1    < ts  T and Gj
are constant real matrices. Knowing U(t) = U , we can write
Xt = YtX0 +
Z t
0
YtY
 1()Q()U d +
Z t
0
YtY
 1()Q() d: (11)
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Substituting (11) in (10), we have
SX
j=0
[GjY (tj)]X0+
SX
j=0
Z tj
0
GjY (tj)Y
 1()Q()U() d+
Z tj
0
GjY (tj)Y
 1()R() d = H (12)
By setting:
'j() =
8<:1 if  2 [0; tj [0 if  2 [tj ; T ]
and rewriting (12) accordingly, we have
A1X0 +
Z t
0
B1()U() d = H1 (13)
withH1 = H 
PS
j=0
R tj
0 GjY (tj)Y
 1()Q()R() d, A1 =
PS
j=0[GjY (tj)] andB1 =
PS
j=0 'j()
GjY (tj)Y
 1()Q(). Equation (13) is a system of integral equations. By setting r = 1, the so-
lution is written as:
U = B1c+ v: (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) yields
A1X0 +A2c = H1: (15)
This means that when the ranks of the two matrices (A1; A2) and (A1; A2;H1) are equal, then
X(t) is solution of Equation (2). The same expression of U(t) holds when the limit conditions
of (10) are continuous as:Z T
0
dG()X() = H: (16)
3.1.b The nonlinear case
We now consider a more general case in which the equation of variation of agents' performance
is written as
_Xt = P (t)Xt +Q(t)Ut +Rt + G(t;Xt; Ut; ): (17)
The nonlinear case is more general than the linear one, with the additional term G(t;Xt; Ut; ).
The nonlinear case takes into account two factors. First mixed interventions, then interventions
where there are resistances, meaning for which people are reluctant. Indeed, it is possible that a
government undertakes discrete interventions, which are supplemented by those undertaken by
local authorities and households. In this case, it is dicult to isolate the specic eects of each
intervention. For example, if a government undertakes health interventions, local authorities can
specialize in nutrition interventions and households are involved in the monitoring of teaching of
pupils, then these types of interventions are not exhaustive, but exclusive. Their specic eects
on educational outcome are not controllable, and it can be dicult to identify the most eective
intervention.
Etudes et Documents n° 08, CERDI, 2015 
11
Similarly, community or individual resistance may occur, depending on the types of inter-
ventions and geographical locations. Often in developing countries, some ethnic backgrounds
make people reluctant to nutrition and health policies (e.g. deworming) which are set up by
government. Then sociocultural considerations may lead to distrust. If government wants to
intervene, underperformance following from this kind of resistances may occur. The nonlinear
specication integrates all these considerations, given that educational performances are not
reached in a simple manner, and that there are complex factors that make policies dicult to
implement or rarely eective.
In Equation (17), more specically in the term G(t;Xt; Ut; ),  is a parameter and G
denotes a vector function. We shall assume impulse interventions meaning that interventions
are constant. In other words, they are of the same type between t0 (initial time) and the nal time
T . Specically, the vector Ut is constant in time intervals [tj ; tj+1] with bounds, t0; t1; t2;    ; T .
The rationale of such assumption is that it is typically the kind of intervention encountered in
the reality. For example: for school feeding programs, foods are provided at xed hours and
identically to all pupils; in the case of subsidies granted to pupils' parents, the scholarships are
regularly and equally paid approximately at the same period; in the case of academic support
consisting in helping students to catch up delays, this support usually occurs at xed hours, etc.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that we associate to every pair of bounded sets G0 and GT a scalar
0 = 0(G0; GT ) such that whatever 0 < T . There exists an intervention Ut that leads X0
from G0 to XT belonging to GT .
Proof. We set
A(T ) =
Z T
0
B(t)B(t) dt, where B(t) = Y  1(t)Q(t): (18)
Suppose that we have X(t) and U(t) such that Equation (17) is veried. Then (17) can be
written as:
Xt = Y (t)X0 + Y (t)
Z t
0
Y  1() [Q()U() +R() + G(;X;U; )] d: (19)
By setting t = T , we have
Y  1(T )XT  X0 =
Z T
0
B()U()d+
Z T
0
Y  1() [Q()U() +R() + G(;X;U; )] d: (20)
Writing U = Bc+ v, it follows that
c = A(T )

Y  1(T )XT  X0  
Z T
0
Y  1()R()d   
Z T
0
Y  1()G(;X;U; )d

: (21)
Replacing for (21) in U , we have:
U(t) = U0(t) + B
A 1(T )

 
Z T
0
Y  1()G(;X;U; )d

(22)
U0(t) = B
A 1(T )

Y  1(T )XT  X0  
Z T
0
Y  1()R()d

+ v(t): (23)
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Then, it is easy to nd that:
X(t) = X0(t)+
Z T
0
Y ()Y  1()G(;X;U; )d   Y (t)A(t)A 1(T )
Z T
0
Y  1()G(;X;U; )d

(24)
with X0(t) = Y (t)
h
X0 +
R t
0 B()U0()d +
R t
0 Y
 1()R()d
i
. Equations (23) and (24) show
that for  = 0 and U = U0(t), Equation (17) has X = X0(t) as solution. 
In what follows, we provide examples that illustrate dierent modes of interventions.
Example 1
Suppose that the intervention consists of providing school meals. We seek to measure the eects
of such program on the concentration time of pupils in class. This concentration time is assumed
to have a direct impact on pupils' academic performance. This problem can be described by the
following equation:
_Xt = AXt +GUt (25)
where Xt measures the dierence between the maximum score and its current level:
Xt =
0BB@
X1
...
Xn
1CCA ; A =
0BB@
A11    A1n
...
...
...
An1    Ann
1CCA ; G =
0BB@
G11    G1n
...
...
...
Gn1    Gnn
1CCA ; Ut =
0BB@
U1
...
Un
1CCA
Equation (25) can also be re-written as
dXj
dt
=
nX
k=1
AjkXk +
rX
l=1
AjlUl; j = 1;    ; n:
The solution of this given by
Xt = X0e
At +
Z t
0
eA(t )GU() d: (26)
It is straightforward to show that the interventions that can reduce the performance gap between
t = 0 and t = T take the form
eUt =  G0eA0tM 1X0 (27)
where M =
R t
0 e
 AGG0e A0d, and A0 and G0 denote the transpose matrices. If one considers
the much simpler form of education performance variation:
_Xt = a+ Ut; (28)
then, the intervention becomes
eUt =   2a
1  e 2aT e
 atX0: (29)
This mode of intervention is typically the one undertaken by a government.
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Example 2
Let us consider a discrete time problem where the change in performance over time is described
by
Xt  Xt 1 = aXt 1 + bUt + r: (30)
Equation (30) can be interpreted as follows: the dierence between the performance before and
after the access to the intervention depends on the initial performance and the intervention
Ut. For the intervention to be optimal, in the sense that Xt > Xt 1, it must be of the form
U = Bc + v. This implies that the intervention is constant in the time interval [t   1; t]. By
induction we have:
Xt = (1 + a)
tX0 +
tX
j=1
(1 + a)j 1(bUn j+1 + r): (31)
As long as the intervention is constant over time, we have:
eU1 = Xt   (1 + a)tX0
b
Pt
j=1(1 + a)
j 1  
r
b
: (32)
This mode of intervention can be associated with community intervention.
Example 3
We consider a school located in an area where local government seeks to raise the level of
academic achievement. The goal of the intervention is supporting a given number pupils to
make sure that they will be enrolled. Let X denote the number of pupils who achieve the
primary school and X0 the number of pupils enrolled at the starting period. Let U be the
proportion of pupils involved in a school achievement program. Assume that the decision is
based on the mechanism
_Xt = aX + bU; 0  U  1: (33)
The aim is to set the nal value XT as large as possible at the end of the process. It is easy
to nd that eU = 1 and max 1U1XT = X0e aT + ba(1   e aT ). This example illustrates an
intervention that can be designed by local authorities.
3.2 Impacts of interventions under uncertainty
As discussed earlier, interventions depend on many uncontrolled factors that may impact their
eectiveness. Informal and formal environments, risk aversion, shared common vision and other
parameters have to be taken into account. In fact, uncertainty is the most realistic approach in
modeling interventions and several factors support this approach. First, there is no deterministic
causal relationship between the actions of authorities and educational achievement. Instead,
authorities try to establish the best conditions (good home, school and community environments,
etc.) for an improvement of pupils performance. Pupils are all dierent and their reactions
to interventions can be highly variable from one individual to another. Indeed, their innate
characteristics are not the same, some may be more eective in scientic topics, some in literary
or artistic materials. Thus, the lack of information on certain socio-economic and personal
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characteristics of pupils or students, is an uncertainty factor that weighs on the achievement
of performance targets. Then the implementation of interventions is not always controllable.
Communities, schools and households, may be vulnerable to unforeseen shocks that negatively
aect pupils' performance (nancing problems, oods, disease, etc.). Given these uncertain
factors, a probabilistic approach suits better our purpose. The dierence with the deterministic
model is that the probability of occurrence of random events are embedded in the system of
stochastic equations.
3.2.a The linear case
We assume that the factors that inuence the intervention target lead to equations of motion:
_Xt = A(t)Xt +B(t)Ut +R(t) + C(t)Yt; (34)
where A(t), B(t) and R(t) are vectors whose components depend on time. They are dened
on the support [0; T ]. The criteria measuring the performance is still the vector Xt and the
intervention is captured by Ut. Yt is a stochastic vector with components y1(t); y2(t);    ; ym(t).
They are also dened onto [0; T ]. We denote Z(t) the fundamental matrix of the homogeneous
system: _Xt = A(t)Xt with Z(0) = E, where E is the unitary matrix. Suppose that D is a
domain in the phase space and dene:
J(Ut) = P fX(T ) 2 Dg : (35)
The functional J is the probability that the end of the stochastic trajectory of the performances
arrives at the region D. The issue is to nd the better interventions Ut that lead to a maximum
level of J . The mathematical expectation of Xt is:
E(Xt) = Z(t)E(X0) +
Z t
0
Z()Z 1() [BU() +R() + CE(Y )] d: (36)
This expression leads to a simple form of the variance of Xt,
V(Xt) = E[Xs(t)  as(t)]2 (37)
with
as = a
0
s(t) +
Z t
0
rX
j=1
csj(t; )Ujd; s = 1; 2;    ; n:
Assume that the X1 component follows a normal distribution with mean a1(t) and standard
deviation
p
V1(t). The value J1(U) = PfX1(t)  g is the probability of reaching the right end
of the stochastic trajectory X(T ) in the overall performance delimited by    X1(T )  . Our
goal is to nd interventions that maximize J1(U) under the constraint that j Uj j j = 1;    ; r.
Let us consider the case of the functional J1(U) as normal by setting:
J1(U) =
Z 
 
1p
2V1(T )
exp

 (X   a1(T ))
2
2V1(T )

dX: (38)
We have @J1(U)@a1(T ) > 0 for the following conditions: if a1(T ) > 0 and a1(T ) is decreasing or if
a1(T ) < 0 and a1(T ) is increasing. As a result, J1(U) is minimum if j a1(T ) j is the smallest
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possible. Let us denote (Uj )j=1; ;r the optimal intervention. Then, i) if a

1(T ) > 0 and a

1(T )+R T
0
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d > 0 then Uj =  sgn c1j(T; ); and ii) if a1(T ) < 0 and a1(T ) +R T
0
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d < 0 then Uj = sgn c1j(T; ). As a result, whatever the case, we have
Uj =  sgn a1(T )c1j(T; ). With these optimal interventions, the value of the probability of the
event `reaching the ultimate goal of performance' is:
J1 (U) =
Z 
 
1p
2V1(t)
exp
"
 (X   a

1(T ) +
R T
0
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d)2
2V1(t)
#
dX: (39)
However, if a1(T ) > 0 and a1(T ) +
R T
0
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d < 0, then interventions become
innite. For a given interval [0; t0], we can take one of the actions, and for the complementary
interval, we set that there is no intervention. Therefore, we have Uj =  sgn a1(T )c1j(T; )
within [0; t0] and U

j = 0 within (t0; T ]. We chose t0 as the smallest t where we have: a

1(T ) =R t
0
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d < 0. Similarly, if a1(T ) < 0, t0 is the minimum time to have: a1(T ) =
  R t0 Prj=1 j c1j(T; ) j d < 0.
The vector of performance may be controlled not only on the last portion of its path, but also
on one or more time intervals. However, these time intervals must comply with a condition. Let

 be the union of these intervals and 
c its complement such that 
\
c = ; and 
[
c = [0; T ].
If Uj = sgn a

1(T )c1j(T; ) when t 2 
c and Uj = 0 when t 2 
, this intervention is optimal for
a1(T ) = sgn a1(T )
R

c
Pr
j=1 j c1j(T; ) j d < 0. The expectations of performances X1;    ; Xn,
are then aj = a

T (T ) +
R T
0
Pr
j=1 bijui d for j = 1;    ; n and i = 1;    ; r.
In the case where the variables X1(T );    ; Xk(T ) are independent and follow a normal
distribution, their cumulative distribution function is F (1;    ; k) = F1(1)F2(2)   Fk(k)
where Fj(j) denotes the cumulative distribution function of (Xj(T ))j=1; ;k:
Fj(j) =
Z j
 1
1p
2Vj(T )
exp

 (X   a1(T ))
2
2Vj(T )

dX: (40)
Let J(U) = J1(U)J2(U)    Jk(U) = P fX1(T );    ; Xk(T ) 2 Dg denotes the probability that
the nal performance belong to domain D, with  j  Xj(T )  , and  > 0. For k = 1, the
intervention turns out to be following from Equation (38). What are the interventions when
k > 1?
Suppose that U = (U1 ;    ; Ur ) is optimal, and Uj =  1; 0 or 1. Consider  2 [0; T ] such
that Uj does not change in the interval [ "; +"] for " suciently small. We can search Uj as
follows: it is Uj () =  " for t 2 [ "; +"]. Similarly, it is Uj for  2 [0; T ] and t 2 [ "; +"].
Consider the intervention U = (U1 ;    ; Uj 1; Uj ; Uj+1; Ur ). We have J(U)  J( U) for all "
small. By substitution, we have aj = aj(U
) + j = aj( U) for j = 1;    ; k.
Observe that J( U) can be expanded in power series of i:
J( U) = J(U) +
kX
i=1
@J( U)
@i

1==k=0
i +    (41)
Let us set $i =
@J( U)
@i

1==k=0 for i = 1;    ; k. Then, $i =
h
@Ji( U
)
@i
i
J(U)
Ji(U)

1==k=0. We
deduce that
$i =
1p
2Vi

exp

 (    ai(U
))2
2Vi

  exp

 (   ai(U
))2
2Vi

J(U)
Ji(U)
: (42)
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Thus, sgn$i =  sgn ai(U), e.g., $i and  ai(U) are of the same sign. Suppose we have,
whatever " small enough
Pk
i=1$ii = 0. Then, as U
 is optimal,
Pk
i=1$ii < 0. Regarding i,
we have:
i = ai( U
)  ai(U) =  2
Z +"
 "
"jbij(t)dt =  2
Z +"
 "
Ubij(t)dt: (43)
Similarly, we have
Pk
i=1$ii =  2
R +"
 "
Pk
i=1$ibijU

j dt

and as the integrant is positive,
Uj = sgn
Pk
i=1$ibij .
As there is only one value $1 of the same sign as  a1(U) and therefore of the same sign
as  a if there is no part of the time when policy makers or other agents do not intervene,
Uj =  sgn(abj). If k > 1, we can use this method of calculation by approximation. Let U1
be an intervention. We then use this framework to nd out $11;    ; $k1 as we did for the
computation of $1;    ; $k thanks to U.
Then let U2j = sgn
Pk
i=1$i1bij for t 2 [0; T ]. The intervention U2j = (U21 ;    ; U2r ) is the
second approximation of the process, which results in the sequence U1; U2;    ; Ur of successive
approximations. The system U2j = sgn
Pk
i=1$ibij is a system of integral equations that enables
us to nd optimal interventions. The following result holds:
Proposition 3 Optimal interventions Uj = sgn
Pk
i=1$ibij for j = 1;    ; r are solutions of
the system of integral equations.
We refer to appendix (see Appendix A) for the general resolution of this system.
3.2.b The nonlinear case
If the system is nonlinear, it can be written in the general form
dXs
dt
= fs(x1;    ; xn;u1;    ; ur; y1;    ; ym); s = 1;    ; n (44)
and J(u) is the functional dened on integral curves given by Equation (44). It denes the
probability that the extreme performance X(T ) holds in a region of phase space. The in-
terventions u1;    ; ur are constrained and u1;    ; ur are optimal interventions that maximize
J(U). Let 1;    ; n be a sequence of random variables such that E(i) = 0, E(ij) = 0,
8i 6= j and E(2i ) = 1. We have yj  lj(r)
P1
i=1 lji(r)i for j = 1;    ;m. Moreover, we have
E

yi   lj  
Pk
i=1 ljii
2  !
k !1
0 which is the convergence in mean towards the value yi of the
sequence. The system can be rewritten as:
dXs
dt
= fs(t; x1;    ; xn;u1;    ; ur; 1;    ; k): (45)
We stop the sequence at k in amputating k+1 to determine the solution of Equation (45).
For u1;    ; ur xed, we set j1;    ; jk for j = 1;    ; l and determine the solution of Equation
(45) associated with realizations j and initial conditions x
0 = xj for t = 0, j = 1;    ; l
(deterministic). We then form an interpolation polynomial
x = (t; 1;    ; k) (46)
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such that xj = (t; j1;    ; jk) provides the solution to Equation (45) for any sequence j1;    ; jk.
Then we determine J(u) from Equation (46). For k and l large enough, we determine the optimal
interventions as:
J =
Z T
0
E [(X(t)  Z(t))]2 dt (47)
for a given deterministic form. Then we substitute (46) into (47) to have:
J =
Z T
0
f0

t1; x
1(t)   xl(t)

(48)
where Xj are deterministic solutions of Equation (44). Computations are then done by the
Lagrangian method.
Example 4
We consider a problem of policy interventions in discrete time, on group of schools, by assuming
that that pupils' performance evolves randomly and therefore require random interventions.
These intervention requests are supposed to be Markovian, meaning that the decision makers
face uncontrolled situations that do not depend on them. For example, school dropouts can lead
to losses of performances, and can be supposed to follow a Markov process.9 We assume that
the performance is compared to a standard level, so that intervention requests depend on the
dierence between current and standard levels. Let us denote them vt (assumed independent
with the same probability distribution, P(vt)). The dierence of performances is denotedXt, and
can be positive (the current performances are greater than the standard level) or negative (the
current performances are less than the standard ones). For sake of simplicity, we still refer to Xt
as performance, even if it represents the dierence from the standard level. The performances
are produced in each period, by interventions aiming to improve them. The interventions are
noted Ut  0.
There are two costs associated with the production of performance: i) the cost of performance
itself, and the cost of lack of performance, denoted f(Xt). Thus, a) when Xt  0, f(Xt) is
interpreted as the cost to maintain the level of performance; b) when Xt < 0, f(Xt) is the cost
of weak performance. ii) The cost of implementation of the intervention Ut denoted g(Ut).
The optimization consist in minimizing the costs of the intervention:
min
Ut
E
T 1X
t=0
[f(Xt) + g(Ut)] (49)
under the dynamical constraints: Xt+1 = Xt   Ut + Vt. The dynamic programming function is
then:
V (t; x) = min
Us
E
(
T 1X
t=0
[f(Xt) + g(Ut)]
Xt
= x
)
; with s = t;    ; T   1: (50)
The equation of the dynamic programming is stated as:
V (t; x) = min
U2R+
Z
v
V (t+ 1; Xt; Ut   vt)

P(dvt) + f(Xt) + g(Ut) (51)
with V (t; x) = 0, where T is the nal period.
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Solving this equation gives the optimal cost Vt and a Markov decision strategy, as we suppose
that intervention requests are Markovian. Over an innite horizon, meaning that there are
innite renewal of the cohorts of pupils, if we discount the cost of interventions and school
performances at the rate r, the dynamic programming problem is:
min
Ut
E
( 1X
t=0
[f(Xt) + g(Ut)]
(1 + r)t+1
)
(52)
under the dynamical constraints: Xt+1 = Xt   Ut + Vt, and
V (t; x) =
1
1 + r
min
Ut0
Z
v
V (Xt + Ut   vt)P(dvt) + g(Ut) + f(Xt)

: (53)
The period T can tend to innity and the asymptotic behavior of the function of dynamic
programming has solutions of the form: e(Xt) =  mT + (Xt) where m is the average cost per
period. If we substitute V (t;Xt) by e(Xt), the dynamic equation becomes:
m+ (Xt) = min
Ut0
Z
v
(Xt + Ut   vt)P(dvt) + g(Ut) + f(Xt)

: (54)
We check by recurrence that e(Xt) is solution of the dynamic equation. Let us consider that a
period of time has a length . We suppose the following particular case: i) f(Xt) = X
2
t ; ii)
P(dvt) = 1 within the period of length  and P(dvt) = 0 elsewhere; iii) g(Ut) = 0 if Ut > 0 and
g(Ut) = 1 if Ut = 0; iv) We replace m by m. The problem of optimality of the intervention is
then:
m = min

inf
Ut>0
[(Xt + Ut   ]  (Xt) + 1; (Xt   )  (Xt)

+ X2t : (55)
If  tends to zero, we have:
min

inf
Ut>0
[(Xt + Ut   ]  (Xt) + 1; 0(Xt) +X2t  m

= 0 (56)
The solution is
(Xt) =
1
3
X3t  mXt: (57)
Then the minimum is reached at Xt =
p
m with  23m
3
2 as minimum value.
4 Optimality of interventions and social welfare
The issue regarding the role of education is wider than the impact of interventions on school
performances. Education appears to be of great importance for development and economic
growth (Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). All the stakeholders involved in the
education system may have dierent targets in the short run. But the ultimate long run objec-
tives are the same: promote economic development and social welfare. That is why governments
in developing countries are inclined to undertake policies that enhance educational attainment
and achievement. As shown by Glewwe (2002), many scholars and international organizations
recognize that investment in education is a priority for development and welfare (Becker, 1995;
Hanushek, 1987). In this section, we study the conditions of welfare improvement following from
interventions.
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4.1 The conditions of deterministic equilibrium
In our context, the relation between education and welfare can broadly be studied by taking
into account the dierence between the objectives of the stakeholders and the future labor
productivity arising from skills acquired through education. The impact of dierent skills on
future income and on other socioeconomic outcomes may have implications on the kinds of
interventions in education. The previous two propositions dene the existence of interventions.
We can now extend this framework to social welfare that integrates utility functions of all
stakeholders. As previous, the variation in performance is described by the equation _Xt =
F (t;Xt; Ut). Do interventions that maximize social welfare exist? We assume social welfare
function to be of the form:
WF =
Z T
0
L(S(t))w(t)dt (58)
where S is the utility function which is dened on a set of variables including consumption and
health of agents (for example pupils). The function L is weighted by w(t) which represents the
time allocation (either for education, or for work). The main issue we face here is that each
stakeholder has a utility function. For each, we dene an explicit form of the function and
aggregate them in a specic social welfare function.
For the values to be optimal, we assume that the utility function S(t) : R+ ! R+ is C1
with S0C > 0, S
00
C < 0 and limC(t)!0 S
0
C ! 1 where C(t) denotes any of the arguments of the
function S(t).
Observe that education provides human capital in the form of skills and ability and leads to
higher probabilities to get into the labor market. The question is: how can the interventions in
the education system lead to a better welfare for the whole population? A plausible approach is
to run an optimization problem for each stakeholder taking into account his/her own objective
and his/her budget constraints. However, it appears more tractable to start from a general
framework where a social planner maximizes the social welfare function that integrates the
parameters depending on the stakeholders' objectives.
The households have as objective to maximize a utility function with two arguments: con-
sumption of goods and services and child cognitive skills. At the last period of schooling, T ,
pupils start working and they have earnings. Part of these earnings is given to parents and to
the other stakeholders of the education system, such as the government and the local adminis-
trations, by the mean of taxes for example.
A utility function that embeds parents' consumption Ct from periods t0 to T and child skills
Xt as arguments is:
St = S(Ct; Xt; ; 
0) (59)
where  is a discount factor for future consumption and 0 is a value representing the households'
incentive to have educated children. The higher 0 the more parents prefer educated children
who will help them increase their future consumption. The production function of skills is given
by:
Xt = I(q; ; e) (60)
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where q is the school quality, and  denotes the years of schooling. The function I is increasing in
q and . The parameter e is the child's learning eciency (her/his own personal characteristics
and those of parents: ability, motivation, etc.). It is an opportunity that enhances the possibility
for children to better perform at school. Households' consumption is given by:
Ct = a(Wt   ) + (1  a)(Wt + W ct;d) (61)
with 8<:a = 1 if t  a = 0 if t >  (62)
The parameter  is the price of schooling, Wt is the households' income in period t, W
c
t;d are
respectively the child's gross and disposable income when she/he works, and d is the fraction of
the disposable income spent in the household. The rst term represents the income when the
children are still attending school. The second term is the income when they do work. Let the
income tax rates levied by the government be  . We have:
Ct =Wt   a + (1  a)(1  )W ct : (63)
The income of children increases with their skills by the equation:
W ct = z(Xt; Ut) (64)
where z is a function that links skills and income in the labor market. Households' utility
function can then be written as function of years of schooling  and school quality q:
St = S(Wt   a + (1  a)(1  )z(Xt);Xt;;0): (65)
Relying on Equation (58), the global welfare is given by
WF =
Z T
t0
L

S(Wt   a + (1  a)(1  )z(Xt);Xt;Ut;;0)

w(t)dt (66)
The welfare function is maximized under the constraint of motion equation of skills
_Xt = F (t;Xt; Ut): (67)
The Hamiltonian of optimization problem for WF is
H = L

S(Wt   a + (1  a)(1  )z(Xt);Xt;Ut;;0)

w(t) + tF (t;Xt; Ut): (68)
The optimality conditions are given by the state equation:
@L
@St
@St
@Ut
w(t) + t
@F
@Ut
= 0 (69)
and by the co-state equation:
_t =  (1  a)(1  ) @L
@St
@St
@z
@z
@Xt
w(t)  @St
@Xt
  t @F
@Xt
: (70)
The conditions of existence of optimal interventions depend on the expression of L and its
characteristics (continuity, dierentiability and concavity).
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4.2 The case of stochastic welfare
Skills lead to higher future incomes and are an incentive for parents to get their children educated.
Household's utility is supposed to depend on the current income, and on the expected income of
children. The presence of skilled and unskilled labor in the production sector leads to unequal
distribution of wages. Indeed, workers can be skilled or not and earn future income. The
time spent in education diers between children, so do their innate abilities and their parents'
education. The child's ability is a stochastic variable and does not dependent on parents'
abilities. Parents pay their children's education and their involvement in the education is related
to the probabilities of being skilled or unskilled. As a result, the utility function of households
depends now on the fact that children may not acquire the skills they expected and this will
have an impact on their expected incomes. The expected utility of the parents is:
E(St) = S(E(Ct); Xt; ; 0): (71)
The expected income of the children from dierent types of households is:
E(Cs;t) = Ws;t   as + (1  a)(1  s)E(W cs;t) (72)
E(Cn;t) = Wn;t   an + (1  a)(1  n)E(W cn;t): (73)
Parents are supposed to educate their children when the expected utility with educated children
is greater. Then we have:
S(Ws;t   as + (1  a)(1  s)E(W cs;t);Xt;Ut;; 0)  (74)
S(Ws;t + (1  a)(1  s)E(W cs;t);Xt;Ut;; 0)
S(Wn;t   an + (1  a)(1  n)E(W cn;t);Xt;Ut;; 0)  (75)
S(Wn;t + (1  a)(1  n)E(W cn;t);Xt;Ut;; 0):
This means that, with the same household income, children from unskilled household drop earlier
from education than the others, meaning that n  s. The global expected welfare is then:
WF =
Z T
t0

L

S(E(Cs;t);Xt;; 0)

+ L

S(E(Cn;t);Xt;; 0)

w(t)dt: (76)
One of the objectives the authorities can have is to reduce the dierence between skilled and
unskilled wages, as the decision to invest in education depends on its cost and on the expected
income from education, knowing that skilled labor is more protable in terms of future income.
The issue they face is to enhance the education of the children of unskilled parents.
5 Populations dynamics and growth under uncertainty
In this section, we now address the issue of global approach to the impacts of the dierent types
of populations and their dynamics on economic growth. We have an economy with two sectors:
the education sector and a commodity sector. We include leisure as argument in the utility
functions. Physical capital is used in both sectors. There are also two types of consumers:
skilled who use part of their leisure time for the education of their children and the unskilled.
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5.1 The economy
Households live innite periods, Ls and Ln represent respectively the skilled and non skilled
labor. Skilled workers devote a fraction ust of their time to the commodity production sector,
while lst is the fraction of leisure, which is divided into two elements: l
O
st and l
C
st. The rst one
is their own time of leisure and the second one is the part of lst used to help children in their
education.
5.1.a The rm problem
The rms are supposed to behave competitively and the production function of the commodity
is:
't = 't( eK1t; eH1t; eLn) = !tA(vt eKt)1(ust eHt)2 eL3n (77)
where vt is the part of the capital used in the production sector, eHt is the aggregate human
capital stock, A is the technology and !t denotes a random perturbation in technology.
10 We
assume that !t follows an autoregressive process (AR1):
ln!t = a1 ln!t 1 + "1t; ja1j < 1 (78)
and we assume that "1t  N(0; 21). In the education sector, human capital is produced by using
physical and human capital and the latter is supposed to depreciate at rate h leading to:
~ht+1 = t(~k2t; ~h2t) + (1  h)~ht
= tB

(1  vt)~kt
1
(1  ust   lst)~ht
2
+ (1  h)~ht (79)
where B is the level of technology, ~ht is the stock of human capital per worker, (1   vt) is the
fraction of physical capital used for the production of human capital, (1 ust  lst) is the fraction
of time used for the education, t is a random technology shock which is supposed to follow an
AR(1) process:
ln t = a2 ln t 1 + "2t; ja2j < 1 (80)
and where we assume that "2t  N(0; 22).
5.1.b The household problem
We have two types of households: the skilled and the unskilled. Each derives utility from
consumption and leisure. The utility function for each of these households is assumed to be of
a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) type and respectively:
Us = Us(~cst; ~lst) =
(~cpst
~l1 pst )
1    1
1   (81)
Un = Un(~cnt; ~lnt) =
(~cpnt
~l1 pnt )
1    1
1   (82)
where s means skilled and n stands for unskilled and  denotes the elasticity of substitution.
The representative consumer of each type maximizes the following expected utility:
max
f~ct;~lt;~it~ut;~vt;~kt+1;~ht+1g
E
 1X
t=0
tU
 
~ct; ~lt

(83)
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under the constraints:
(1  c)~ct +~it = (1  r)rtvt~kt + rkvt~kt + (1  w)wtut~ht (84)
(1 + n)~kt+1 = ~it + (1  k)~kt (85)
~ht+1 = t(~k2t; ~h2t) + (1  h)~ht (86)
where ~it is the investment in physical capital, rt is the interest rate, wt is the wage rate, c; r and
w stand for the tax rates on consumption, capital and labor income.  is the discount factor.
This maximization program is specied for each type of household and its own parameters. For
` = (s; n), the Lagrangian of the problem is given by:
L`(~c`t; ~l`t; ~u`t; ~v`t; ~k`;t+1; `t; `t) = E
 1X
t=0
t
(~cp`t
~l1 p`t )
1    1
1  
+ t`t

  (1 + c)~c`t   (1 + n`)~k`;t+1 + (1  k)~k`t
+ (1  `r)rtvt~kt + rkvt~kt + (1  w)wtut~ht

+ t`t

  ~h`;t+1 +
 
(1  vt)~k`t(1  u`t   ~l`t)~h`t)
+ (1  h)~h`t

: (87)
The rst order conditions are:
p~c
p(1 ) 1
`t
~l
(1 p)(1 )
`t = `t(1 + c) (88)
(1  p)~cp(1 )`t ~l(1 p)(1 ) 1`t = `ttB1

(1  vt)~kt
1
[(1  u`t   l`t)]2 1~h2t (89)
(1  w)w`t`t = `ttB2

(1  vt)~kt
1
[(1  u`t   l`t)~ht]2 1 (90)
`rk + (1  `r)rt

`t = `ttB1

(1  vt)~kt
1 1
[(1  u`t   l`t)~ht]2 (91)
`t(1 + n`) =  Et

`;t+1((1  `r)rt+1vt+1 + rkvt+1 + 1  k) (92)
+ `;t+1t+1(1  vt+1)B1

(1  vt+1)~kt+1
1 1

(1  u`;t+1   l`;t+1)~ht+1
2
`t =  Et

`;t+1(1  w)w`;t+1ut+1 + `;t+1

t+1B2

(1  vt+1)~kt+1
1

(1  u`;t+1   l`;t+1)
2 1~h2t+1 + 1  h: (93)
The limit conditions are:
lim
i!1
Ett
 
`;t+i~kt+i+1

= 0 (94)
lim
i!1
Ett
 
`;t+i~ht+i+1

= 0 ` = s; n: (95)
The representative rm maximizes the prot of each period:
max
f ~K1t; ~H1t;~Lng
't( ~K1t; ~H1t; ~Ln)  rk ~K1t   wst ~H1t   wnt ~Ln (96)
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with 't( ~K1t; ~H1t; ~Ln) = !tA(vt eKt)1(ust eHt)2 eL3n . The rst order conditions are then:
rt = !t1A(vt eKt)1 1(ust eHt)2 eL3n (97)
wst = !t2A(vt eKt)1(ust eHt)2 1eL3n (98)
wnt = !t3A(vt eKt)1(ust eHt)2 eL3 1n : (99)
5.1.c The government problem
The government collect taxes from consumption, capital and labour to nance its expenditures
Gt. The global equality of resources and expenses holds:
eCt + eKt+1   (1  k) eKt +Gt = !tA(vt eKt)1(ust eHt)2 eL3n : (100)
5.2 Competitive equilibrium: steady state analysis
We now characterize the competitive equilibrium, which is given by the values of the variables
~ct; ~lt; ~ut; ~vt; ~kt+1; ~ht+1; rt; wt that maximize the prots and optimize the utilities under the con-
straints of each type of agent. We have the following results (see detail calculations in Appendix
B):
(1  w)!t2A(vt~kt)1(us;t~ht)2 1eL1+2+3 1n
(1  sr)!t1A(vt~kt)1 1(us;t~ht)2 eL1+2+3 1n + rk = 2(1  vt)
~kt
1(1  ust   ~lst)~hst
: (101)
The marginal rates of transformation of capital and labor in the sectors of education and in the
nal good production are equal:
p~lst
(1  p)(1  c)~cst =
1
(1  w)!t2A(vt~kt)1 1(us;t~ht)2 eL1+2+3 1n : (102)
The marginal rate of substitution of consumption and leisure are equal to the marginal product
of labor:
~c
p(1 ) 1
`t
~l
(1 p)(1 )
`t =
1
1 + n`
 Et

~c
p(1 ) 1
`;t+1
~l
(1 p)(1 )
`;t+1

(1  `r)!t+11A(vt+1~kt+1)1 1
(u`;t+1~ht+1)
2 1eL1+2+3 1n + 1  (1  `r)k ` = s; n (103)
For each group of households, the marginal utility of giving up one unit of current consumption
must be equal to the expected marginal utility of future consumption multiplied by the return
from the investment of that unit of good for one period. This is equal to the marginal product
of physical capital, net of taxes and depreciation rates. In what follows, we establish the steady
state conditions.
A deterministic steady state occurs when the random shocks are all constant, for every value
of t:
ln!t = ln t = 0:
The variables ~lt; ut; vt are also constant at l; u; v and the growth rate of the variables ~ct; ~kt; ~ht; 't
are constant at the respective values gc; gk; gh; gf . By making the log-linear approximation of
the model, we have the following result:
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Proposition 4 If 11 2 >
1 1
2
then the necessary conditions for endogenous growth of the
economy are:
ln(1 + g~k) =
(1  2)(1  1   2   3)
12   (1  1)(1  2) nn

1  nn
2

(104)
ln(1 + g~h) =
1(1  1   2   3)
12   (1  1)(1  2)nn

1  nn
2

: (105)
Proposition 4 states that the growth rate of the unskilled population has a direct impact on the
growth of human and physical capitals. The following gure gives a simulated relation between
the growth rates of human and physical capital for dierent values of the parameters 1 and 2.
Include Figure 1
We observe that the two growth rates have the following equation:
1 ln(1 + gk) + (2   1) ln(1 + gh) = 0:
The two growth rates are equal in case of constant returns. Human capital grows faster than
the physical capital when constant returns do not prevail in the economy.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we develop theoretical frameworks to relate interventions in education to educa-
tional performances. In that regard, we show that uncertainty plays a crucial role in shaping
the optimality of interventions. Uncertainty may follow from lack of information on the socioe-
conomic characteristics of students and the educational environment in which interventions are
implemented. We also enlarge the analysis to the issue of how the performance of the educa-
tional system can be integrated into a macroeconomic performance in terms of well-being and
economic growth. We also link the performance levels to social welfare, on the assumption that
the ultimate goal of policy makers is improving the well-being of individuals. Lastly, we argue
that heterogenous populations where skilled and unskilled groups have dierent demographic
dynamics have dierent implications for economic growth.
In this research, we focused on the study of equilibria by providing optimality conditions of
interventions. Future research would be to examine the stability of optimal equilibria in both
certain and uncertain cases. Indeed, there may be external shocks resulting in disturbances
of the system. For example, natural events that may increase signicantly the risk or more
restrictive and unpredictable budgetary policies that policymakers may face. All these are likely
to aect the stability of equilibria and the way they evolve over time.
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Notes
1The term innovation is used here to refer to the implementation of new practices, the introduction of a new
policy and mobilizing new resources to support the implementation of that policy.
2For instance, technical resources (equipment), human resources (extra sta to support activities and planning
time), physical resources (classroom space), nancial resources, etc.
3In the literature, four core layers are commonly identied and their inuences analyzed: i) the intervention,
ii) the micro level inuences (factors that are relevant to the policy maker such as capacity to innovate), iii)
the mid-level inuences (local level inuences such as educational environment), iv) the macro-level inuences
(national policy and programmes, government initiatives, etc.).
4For instance, allowing competition in schools can motivate and enhance eorts.
5For instance, food policies that promote pupils' access to enough calories. The formal environment has a key
role in creating spaces for sharing existing or innovative practices. Furthermore, it facilitates the partnerships
between all stakeholders in education.
6For example, teacher's perception on the eectiveness of new pedagogical practices implied by an interven-
tion can inuence its success. A shared vision provides clarity of purpose and direction for those who manage
interventions.
7In developing countries, there is a growing contribution of the private sector to education (private school,
universities, etc.)
8The empirical literature on impact assessment of interventions stresses the importance of taking uncertainty
into account. But to date, no work has yet proposed a theoretical study.
9This means that students who leave school (dropout) are replaced by others who enter. This is a replacement
process in which we do not master the reasons of dropout. Moreover, the performance of those who enter is
independent of the performance of those who leave.
10In the sequel, the tilde notation denotes a contemporary variable, say xt, from which we extract the trend at
equilibrium, meaning when the growth rate is constant. That is: ~xt = ln

xt
xt

and therefore xt = x

t e
~xt .
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Appendix
Appendix A
To solve the system leading to the solution in the Proposition 3, one use the following approx-
imation. For example, we search constants c1;    ; ck using ci = '(c1;    ; ck) for i = 1;    ; k.
This turns out to solve an algebraic equation. The algebraic equation is obtained by substituting
Uj =  sgn(abj) in the expressions of ci. Then we can solve by trial search approximation the
minimum of the function E =
Pk
i=1(ci   '(c1;    ; ck))2. If (cn1 ;    ; cnk) is the n-th approxima-
tion of the solution of the equation in ci, the functions 
n
j = sgn
Pk
i=1 c
n
i bij ; j = 1;    ; k are
the n-th approximation of the optimal intervention.
Let us move to the case of random functions y1(t);    ; ym(t) which are independent of t and
are random variables 1;    ; m. Let F1;    ; Fm be respectively the associated response func-
tions. Suppose (to simplify) that 1;    ; m are independent and the initial data are determinis-
tic. The cumulative distribution function of 1;    ; m is F (1;    ; m) = F1(1);    ; Fm(m).
We deduce the distribution function G() of the random variable X1(T ), with:
X1(T ) =
mX
i=1
 i"i +
Z +1
0
X
j=1
bjujdt+ a

1: (A-1)
Set in the space of m variables 1;    ; m, the domain, say S(), dened by X1(T )  . We
have:
G() =
Z
S()
dF (1;    ; m) =
Z +1
 1
dF1(1)
Z +1
 1
dF2(2)   
Z  mm+ X1(T )
 m
 1
dFm(m): (A-2)
Hence the following representation:
G() = G
24 1
 m
0@  a1   Z T
0
rX
j=1
bjujdt
1A35 : (A-3)
Let us seek the optimal intervention that maximizes J(U) = Pfj X1 j g. Let  and  be
respectively the minimum and maximum values of 1 m

a1 +
R T
0
Pr
j=1 bjujdt

and  2 [; ]
the point where G

1
 m
  a

  G

  1 m   a

takes its greatest known value z 2 [; ]. If  = 
or  = , the optimal intervention is j = sgn [(a1   )bj ] for j = 1;    ; r. Otherwise, the
intervention operates only on a portion of the time course. If the intervention is j = 0 in that
case, the intervals or ranges of interventions are dened by:
 = a1 +
Z T
0
rX
j=1
bju

jdt: (A-4)
The problem of determining the optimal intervention is fully resolved by any law of response of
the random variables of the initial system.
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Appendix B
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
p~c
p(1 ) 1
st
~l
(1 p)(1 )
st = st(1 + c) (B-1)
st(1 + ns) =  Et

s;t+1((1  sr)rt+1vt+1 + rkvt+1 + 1  k)
+ s;t+1t+1(1  vt+1)B1

(1  vt+1)~kt+1
1 1

(1  us;t+1   ls;t+1)~ht+1
2
(B-2)
Using [srk + (1  sr)rt]st = sttB1[(1  vt)~kt]1 1[(1  ust   lst)~ht]2 , we can write:
st(1 + ns) =  Et

s;t+1((1  sr)rt+1vt+1 + rkvt+1 + 1  k) (B-3)
+

srk + (1  sr)rt+1
 
1  vt+1

s;t+1
= Et

s;t+1

(1  sr)rt+1 + 1  (1  sr)k

(B-4)
Using the fact that
p~c
p(1 ) 1
s;t+1
~l
(1 p)(1 )
s;t+1
(1+c)
= s;t+1, we have
~c
p(1 ) 1
st
~l
(1 p)(1 )
st =
1
1 + ns
 Et

~c
p(1 ) 1
s;t+1
~l
(1 p)(1 )
s;t+1

(1  sr)rt+1 + 1  (1  sr)k

(B-5)
=
1
1 + ns
 Et

~c
p(1 ) 1
s;t+1
~l
(1 p)(1 )
s;t+1

(1  sr) (B-6)
!t+11A(vt+1 eKt+1)1 1(us;t+1 eHt+1)2 eL3n + 1  (1  sr)k
=
1
1 + ns
 Et
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Figure 1: The relation between the growth of physical capital (gk) and human capital (gh)
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